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Abstract
Let V be a set of n points in Rd, called voters. A point p ∈ Rd is a plurality point for V when the
following holds: for every q ∈ Rd the number of voters closer to p than to q is at least the number of
voters closer to q than to p. Thus, in a vote where each v ∈ V votes for the nearest proposal (and
voters for which the proposals are at equal distance abstain), proposal p will not lose against any
alternative proposal q. For most voter sets a plurality point does not exist. We therefore introduce
the concept of β-plurality points, which are defined similarly to regular plurality points except that
the distance of each voter to p (but not to q) is scaled by a factor β, for some constant 0 < β 6 1.
We investigate the existence and computation of β-plurality points, and obtain the following results.
Define β∗d := sup{β : any finite multiset V in Rd admits a β-plurality point}. We prove that
β∗2 =
√
3/2, and that 1/
√
d 6 β∗d 6
√
3/2 for all d > 3.
Define β(p, V ) := sup{β : p is a β-plurality point for V }. Given a voter set V ∈ R2, we provide
an algorithm that runs in O(n logn) time and computes a point p such that β(p, V ) > β∗2 .
Moreover, for d > 2 we can compute a point p with β(p, V ) > 1/
√
d in O(n) time.
Define β(V ) := sup{β : V admits a β-plurality point}. We present an algorithm that, given a
voter set V in Rd, computes an (1− ε) · β(V ) plurality point in time O( n2
ε3d−2 · log nεd−1 · log2 1ε ).
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1 Introduction
Background. Voting theory is concerned with mechanisms to combine preferences of in-
dividual voters into a collective decision. A desirable property of such a collective decision
is that it is stable, in the sense that no alternative is preferred by more voters. In spatial
voting games [5,10] this is formalized as follows; see Fig. 1(i) for an example in a political
context. The space of all possible decisions is modeled as Rd and every voter is represented
by a point in Rd, where the dimensions represent different aspects of the decision and the
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2 On β-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
Donald Trump
Hillary Clinton
Gary Johnson
Jill Stein
Authoritarian
Libertarian
RightLeft
(i) (ii)
Figure 1 (i) The US presidential candidates 2016 modelled in the spatial voting model,
according to The Political Compass (https://politicalcompass.org/uselection2016).
Note that the points representing voters are not shown. (ii) The point set satisfies the
generalized Plott symmetry conditions and therefore admits a plurality point.
point representing a voter corresponds to the ideal decision for that voter. A voter v now
prefers a proposed decision p ∈ Rd over some alternative proposal q ∈ Rd when v is closer
to p than to q. Thus a point p ∈ Rd represents a stable decision for a given finite set V of
voters if, for any alternative q ∈ Rd, we have ∣∣{v ∈ V : |vp| < |vq|}∣∣ > ∣∣{v ∈ V : |vq| < |vp|}∣∣.
Such a point p is called a plurality point.1
For d = 1, a plurality point always exists, since in R1 a median of V is a plurality point.
This is not true in higher dimensions, however. Define a median hyperplane for a set V of
voters to be a hyperplane h such that both open half-spaces defined by h contain fewer than
|V |/2 voters. For d > 2 a plurality point in Rd exists if and only if all median hyperplanes
for V meet in a common point; see Fig. 1(ii). This condition is known as generalized Plott
symmetry conditions [12,24]; see also the papers by Wu et al. [29] and de Berg et al. [4], who
present algorithms to determine the existence of a plurality point for a given set of voters.
It is very unlikely that voters are distributed in such a way that all median hyperplanes
have a common intersection. (Indeed, if this happens, then a slightest generic perturbation
of a single voter destroys the existence of the plurality point.) When a plurality point
does not exist, we may want to find a point that is close to being a plurality point. One
way to formalize this is to consider the center of the yolk (or plurality ball) of V , where
the yolk [14,18,22,23] is the smallest ball intersecting every median hyperplane of V . We
introduce β-plurality points as an alternative way to relax the requirements for a plurality
point, and study several combinatorial and algorithmic questions regarding β-plurality points.
β-Plurality points: definition and main questions. Let V be a multiset2 of n voters in Rd
in arbitrary, possibly coinciding, positions. In the traditional setting a proposed point p ∈ Rd
wins a voter v ∈ V against an alternative q if |pv| < |qv|. We relax this by fixing a parameter β
with 0 < β 6 1 and letting p win v against q if β · |pv| < |qv|. Thus we give an advantage to
the initial proposal p by scaling distances to p by a factor β 6 1. We now define
V [p β q] := {v ∈ V : β · |pv| < |qv|} and V [p ≺β q] := {v ∈ V : β · |pv| > |qv|}
1 One can also require p to be strictly more popular than any alternative q. This is sometimes called a
strong plurality point, in contrast to the weak plurality points that we consider.
2 Even though we allow V to be a multiset, we sometimes refer to it as a “set” to ease the reading. When
the fact that V is a multiset requires special treatment, we explicitly address this.
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to be the multisets of voters won by p over q and lost by p against q, respectively. Finally,
we say that a point p ∈ Rd is a β-plurality point for V when∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ > ∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣ , for any point q ∈ Rd.
Observe that β-plurality is monotone in the sense that if p is a β-plurality point then p is
also a β′-plurality point for all β′ < β.
The spatial voting model was popularised by Black [5] and Down [10] in the 1950s.
Stokes [27] criticized its simplicity and was the first to highlight the importance of taking
non-spatial aspects into consideration. The reasoning is that voters may evaluate a candidate
not only on their policies—their position in the policy space—but also take their so-called
valence into account: charisma, competence, or other desirable qualities in the public’s
mind [13]. A candidate can also increase her valence by a stronger party support [28] or
campaign spending [19]. Several models have been proposed to bring the spatial model closer
to a more realistic voting approach; see [16, 17, 25] as examples. A common model is the
multiplicative model, introduced by Hollard and Rossignol [20], which is closely related to
the concept of a β-plurality point. The multiplicative model augments the existing spatial
utility function by scaling the candidate’s valence by a multiplicative factor. Note that in the
2-player game considered in this paper the multiplicative model is the same as our β-plurality
model. From a computational point of view very little is known about the multiplicative
model. We are only aware of a result by Chung [8], who studied the problem of positioning a
new candidate in an existing space of voters and candidates, so that the valence required to
win at least a given number of voters is minimized.
One reason for introducing β-plurality was that a set V of voters in Rd, for d > 2,
generally does not admit a plurality point. This immediately raises the question: Is it true
that, for β small enough, any set V admits a β-plurality point? If so, we want to know the
largest β such that any voter set V admits a β-plurality point, that is, we wish to determine
β∗d := sup{β : any finite multiset V in Rd admits a β-plurality point}.
Note that β∗1 = 1, since any set V in R1 admits a plurality point and 1-plurality is equivalent
to the traditional notion of plurality.
After studying this combinatorial problem in Section 2, we turn our attention to the
following algorithmic question: given a voter set V , find a point p that is a β-plurality point
for the largest possible value β. In other words, if we define
β(V ) := sup{β : V admits a β-plurality point}
and
β(p, V ) := sup{β : p is a β-plurality point for V }
then we want to find a point p such that β(p, V ) = β(V ).
Results. In Section 2 we prove that β∗d 6
√
3/2 for all d > 2. To this end we first show that
β∗d is non-increasing in d, and then we exhibit a voter set V in R2 such that β(V ) 6
√
3/2.
We also show how to construct in O(n logn) time, for any given V in R2, a point p such
that β(p, V ) >
√
3/2, thus proving that β∗2 =
√
3/2. Moreover, for d > 2 we show how to
construct in O(n) time a point p such that β(p, V ) > 1/
√
d, which means that β∗d > 1/
√
d.3
3 Very recently Filtser and Filtser [15] improved these results for d > 4 by proving that β∗d >
1
2
√
1
2 +
√
3− 12
√
4
√
3− 3 ≈ 0.557 for any d > 4.
4 On β-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
In Section 3 we study the problem of computing, for a given voter set V of n points in Rd,
a β-plurality point for the largest possible β. (Here we assume d to be a fixed constant.)
While such a point can be found in polynomial time, the resulting running time is quite high.
We therefore focus our attention on finding an approximately optimal point p, that is, a
point p such that β(p, V ) > (1− ε) · β(V ). We show that such a point can be computed in
O( n2
ε3d−2 · log nεd−1 · log2 1ε ) time.
Notation. We denote the open ball of radius ρ centered at a point q ∈ Rd by B(q, ρ) and,
for a point p ∈ Rd and a voter v, we define Dβ(p, v) := B(v, β · |pv|). Observe that p wins v
against a competitor q if and only if q is strictly outside Dβ(p, v), while q wins v if and
only if q is strictly inside Dβ(p, v). Hence, V [p ≺β q] = {v ∈ V : q ∈ Dβ(p, v)}. We define
Dβ(p) := {Dβ(p, v) : v ∈ V }—here we assume V is clear from the context—and let A(Dβ(p))
denote the arrangement induced by Dβ(p). The competitor point q that wins the most voters
against p will thus lie in the cell of A(Dβ(p)) of the greatest depth or, more precisely, the
cell contained in the maximum number of disks Dβ(p, v).
2 Bounds on β∗d
In this section we will prove bounds on β∗d , the supremum of all β such that any finite set
V ⊂ Rd admits a β-plurality point. We start with an observation that allows us to apply
bounds on β∗d to those on β∗d′ for d′ > d. Let conv(V ) denote the convex hull of V .
I Observation 2.1. Let V be a finite multiset of voters in Rd.
(i) Suppose a point p ∈ Rd is not a β-plurality point for V . Then there is a point q ∈ conv(V )
such that
∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ < ∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣.
(ii) For any p′ 6∈ conv(V ), there is a point p ∈ conv(V ) with β(p, V ) > β(p′, V ).
(iii) For any d′ > d we have β∗d′ 6 β∗d .
Proof. Note that for every point r 6∈ conv(V ) there is a point r′ ∈ conv(V ) that lies strictly
closer to all voters in V , namely the point r′ ∈ ∂conv(V ) closest to r′. This immediately
implies part (i): if p is beaten by some point q 6∈ conv(V ) then p is certainly beaten by a
point q′ ∈ conv(V ) that lies strictly closer to all voters in V than q. It also immediately
implies part (ii), because if a point p lies strictly closer to all voters in V than a point p′,
then β(p, V ) > β(p′, V ).
To prove part (iii), let V ∈ Rd be a voter set such that β(V ) = β∗d . Now embed V
into Rd′ , say in the flat xd+1 = · · · = xd′ = 0, obtaining a set V ′. Then β(V ′) = β(V ) by
parts (i) and (ii). Hence, β∗d′ 6 β(V ′) = β(V ) = β∗d . J
We can now prove an upper bound on β∗d .
I Lemma 2.2. β∗d 6
√
3/2, for d > 2.
Proof. By Observation 2.1(iii), it suffices to prove the lemma for d = 2. To this end let
V = {v1, v2, v3} consist of three voters that form an equilateral triangle ∆ of side length 2
in R2; see Fig. 2(i).
Let p denote the center of ∆. We will first argue that β(p, V ) =
√
3/2. Note that
|pvi| = 2/
√
3 for all three voters vi. Hence, for β =
√
3/2, the open balls Dβ(vi, p) are
pairwise disjoint and touching at the mid-points of the edges of ∆. Therefore any competitor q
either wins one voter and loses the remaining two, or wins no voter and loses at least one.
The former happens when q lies inside one of the three balls Dβ(vi, p); the later happens
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v1 v2
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p
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2
2
2/
√ 3
v1 v2
v3
p
V(v3)
E
(ii)(i)
Figure 2 (i) The set V = {v1, v2, v3} of voters and the point p used in the proof of
Lemma 2.2. (ii) The ellipse E is tangent to the Voronoi cell V(v3).
when q does not lie inside any of the balls, because in that case q can be on the boundary of
at most two of the balls. Thus, for β =
√
3/2, the point p always wins more voters than q
does. On the other hand, for β >
√
3/2, any two balls Dβ(vi, p), Dβ(vj , p) intersect and so a
point q located in such a pairwise intersection wins two voters and beats p. We conclude
that β(p, V ) =
√
3/2, as claimed.
The lemma now follows if we can show that β(p′, V ) 6
√
3/2 for any p′ 6= p. Let Vor(V )
be the Voronoi diagram of V , and let V(vi) be the closed Voronoi cell of vi, as shown in
Fig. 2(ii). Assume without loss of generality that p′ lies in V(v3). Let E be the ellipse with
foci v1 and v2 that passes through p. Thus
E := {z ∈ R2 : |zv1|+ |zv2| = 4/
√
3}.
Note that E is tangent to V(v3) at the point p. Hence, any point p′ 6= p in V(v3) has
|p′v1| + |p′v2| > 4/
√
3. This implies that for β >
√
3/2 we have β · |p′v1| + β · |p′v2| > 2,
and so the disks Dβ(p′, v1) and Dβ(p′, v2) intersect. It follows that for β >
√
3/2 there is
a competitor q that wins two voters against p′, which implies β(p′, V ) 6
√
3/2 and thus
finishes the proof of the lemma. J
We now prove lower bounds on β∗d . We first prove that β∗d > 1/
√
d for any d > 2, and then
we improve the lower bound to
√
3/2 for d = 2. The latter bound is tight by Lemma 2.2.
Let V be a finite multiset of n voters in Rd. We call a hyperplane h balanced with respect
to V , if both open half-spaces defined by h contain at most n/2 voters from V . Note the
difference with median hyperplanes, which are required to have fewer than n/2 voters in
both open half-spaces. Clearly, for any 1 6 i 6 d there is a balanced hyperplane orthogonal
to the xi-axis, namely the hyperplane xi = mi, where mi is a median in the multiset of all
xi-coordinates of the voters in V . (In fact, for any direction ~d there is a balanced hyperplane
orthogonal to ~d.)
I Lemma 2.3. Let d > 2. For any finite multi-set V of voters in Rd there exists a point p ∈ Rd
such that β(p, V ) = 1/
√
d. Moreover, such a point p can be computed in O(n) time.
Proof. Let H := {h1, . . . , hd} be a set of balanced hyperplanes with respect to V such
that hi is orthogonal to the xi-axis, and assume without loss of generality that hi is the
hyperplane xi = 0. We will prove that the point p located at the origin is a β-plurality point
for V for any β < 1/
√
d, thus showing that β(p, V ) > 1/
√
d.
Let q = (q1, . . . , qd) be any competitor of p. We can assume without loss of generality
that max16i6d |qi| = qd > 0. Thus q lies in the closed cone C+d defined as
C+d := { (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd : xd > |xj | for all j 6= d }.
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x1
x2
x3
Figure 3 The cone C+3 used in the proof of Lemma 2.3.
Note that C+d is bounded by portions of the 2(d− 1) hyperplanes xd = ±xj with j 6= d; see
Fig. 3.
Because hd : xd = 0 is a balanced hyperplane, the open halfspace h+d : xd > 0 contains at
most n/2 voters, which implies that the closed halfspace cl(h−d ) : xd 6 0 contains at least
n/2 voters. Hence, it suffices to argue that for any β < 1/
√
d the point p wins all the voters
in cl(h−d ) against q.
Claim. For any voter v ∈ cl(h−d ) with v 6= p, we have that sin (∠qpv) > 1/
√
d with
equality if and only if q lies on an edge of C+d and v lies on the orthogonal projection of
this edge onto hd.
Proof. For any point v below hd there is a point v′ ∈ hd with ∠qpv′ < ∠qpv, namely
the orthogonal projection of v onto hd. Hence, from now on we assume that v ∈ hd.
First, we prove that sin(∠qpv) = 1/
√
d if q lies on an edge e of C+d and v lies on
the orthogonal projection e of e onto hd. Assume without loss of generality that e is
the edge of C+d defined by the intersection of the d− 1 hyperplanes xd = xj , so that
q1 = · · · = qd−1 = qd. Since ∠qpv is the same for any v ∈ e, we may assume that v is
the orthogonal projection of q to hd, which means |qv| = qd. We then have
sin (∠qpv) = |qv||pq| =
qd√
q21 + · · ·+ q2d
= 1√
d
.
Now assume the condition for equality does not hold. Let ρ be the ray starting at p
and containing q, and let ρ be its orthogonal projection onto hd. We have two cases:
v ∈ ρ but q is not contained in an edge of C+d , or v 6∈ ρ.
In the former case we may, as before, assume that v is the projection of q onto hd.
Since q ∈ C+d we have qd > |qj | for all j. Moreover, since q does not lie on an edge of C+d
we have qd > |qj∗| for at least one j∗. Thus |pq| =
√
q21 + . . .+ q2d <
√
d · q2d =
√
d · |qv|,
and sin (∠qpv) = |qv|/|pq| > 1/√d.
In the latter case, let ` be the line containing p and v, and let v′ be the point on `
closest to q. Then |qv| > |qv′| > |qq|, where q is the projection of q onto hd, and so
sin (∠qpv) > |qv
′|
|pq| >
|qq|
|pq| >
1√
d
. C
We can now use the Law of Sines and the claim above to derive that for any β < 1/
√
d
and any voter v ∈ cl(h−d ) with v 6= p we have
β · |pv| < 1√
d
· |pv| = 1√
d
· |qv| · sin (∠pqv)sin (∠qpv) 6 |qv| · sin (∠pqv) 6 |qv| .
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p
q
S1
v
S2S3
S4
S5 S6
`1
`2
`3
Figure 4 The partition used in the proof of Lemma 2.4. The regionH = cl(S3∪S4∪S5)
is indicated in grey.
Hence, p wins every point in cl(h−d ). This proves the first part of the lemma since cl(h
−
d )
contains at least n/2 voters, as already remarked.
Computing the point p is trivial once we have the balanced hyperplanes hi, which can be
found in O(n) time by computing a median xi-coordinate for each 1 6 i 6 d.
A tight bound in the plane. In R2 we can improve the above bound: for any voter set V in
the plane we can find a point p with β(p, V ) >
√
3/2. By Lemma 2.2, this bound is tight.
The improvement is based on the following lemma.
I Lemma 2.4. Let V be a multiset of n voters in R2, let `1, `2, `3 be a triple of concurrent
balanced lines such that the smaller angle between any two of them is pi3 , and let p be the
common intersection of `1, `2, `3. Then β(p, V ) >
√
3/2.
Proof. Let q be a competitor of p. The three lines `1, `2, `3 partition the plane into six
equal-sized sectors, which we number S1 through S6 in a clockwise fashion, so that q lies in
the closure of S1; see Figure 4. Let H be the closure of S3 ∪ S4 ∪ S5. It is a closed halfspace
bounded by a balanced line, so it contains at least half the voters.
Using an analysis similar to that in the proof of Lemma 2.3, we can show that p does not
lose any voter v ∈ H. Indeed, using the Law of Sines we obtain
√
3
2 · |pv| =
√
3
2 ·
sin∠pqv
sin∠qpv · |qv| 6 |qv|, since ∠qpv > pi/3,
which shows that p is a β-plurality point for any β <
√
3/2. Hence, β(p, V ) >
√
3/2. J
The main question is whether a triple of concurrent lines as in Lemma 2.4 always exists. The
next lemma shows that this is indeed the case. The lemma—in fact a stronger version, stating
that any two opposite cones defined by the three concurrent lines contain the same number
of points—has been proved for even n by Dumitrescu et al. [11]. Our proof of Lemma 2.5 is
similar to their proof. We give it because we also need it for odd n, and because we will need
an understanding of the proof to describe our algorithm for computing the concurrent triple
in the lemma. Our algorithm will run in O(n logn) time, a significant improvement over the
O(n4/3 log1+ε n) running time obtained (for the case of even n) by Dumitrescu et al. [11].
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θ
µ(θ)(i) (ii)
p23(0)
p13(0)
`1(0)
`2(0)
`3(0)
Figure 5 (i) The balanced line µ(θ). (ii) If p23 is to the left of the directed line `1(0)
then p13(0) is to the right of `2(0).
I Lemma 2.5. For any multiset V of n voters in R2, there exists a triple of concurrent
balanced lines (`1, `2, `3) such that the smaller angle between any two of them is pi3 .
Proof. Define the orientation of a line to be the counterclockwise angle it makes with the
positive y-axis. Recall that for any given orientation θ there exists at least one balanced
line with orientation θ. When n is odd this line is unique: it passes through the median
of the voter set V when V is projected orthogonally onto a line orthogonal to the lines of
orientation θ. In the rest of the proof it will be convenient to have a unique balanced line
for any orientation θ. To achieve this when n is even, we simply delete an arbitrary voter
from V . (If there are other voters at the same location, these voters are not deleted.) This is
allowed because when |V | is even, a balanced line for V \ {v} is also a balanced line for V .
Now let µ be the function that maps an angle value θ to the unique balanced line µ(θ); see
Figure 5(i). Note that µ is continuous for 0 6 θ < pi. Let `1(θ) := µ(θ), and `2(θ) := µ(θ+ pi3 ),
and `3(θ) := µ(θ + 2pi3 ). For i 6= j, let pij(θ) := `i(θ) ∩ `j(θ) be the intersection point
between `i(θ) and `j(θ). If p23(0) ∈ `1(0) then the lines `1(0), `2(0), `3(0) are concurrent and
we are done. Otherwise, consider the situation at θ = 0 and imagine `1(0) and `2(0) to be
directed in the positive y-direction, as in Fig. 5(ii). Clearly, if p23(0) is to the left of the
directed line `1(0) then p13(0) is to the right of the directed line `2(0), and vice versa. Now
increase θ from 0 to pi/3, and note that `1(pi/3) = `2(0) and p23(pi/3) = p13(0). Hence, p23(θ)
lies to a different side of the directed line `1(θ) for θ = 0 than it does for θ = pi/3. Since
both `1(θ) and p23(θ) vary continuously with θ, this implies that, for some θ¯ ∈ (0, pi/3), the
point p23(θ¯) crosses the line `1(θ¯), and so the lines `1(θ¯), `2(θ¯), `3(θ¯) are concurrent. J
The previous two lemmas show that any voter set V in R2 admits a point p such that
β(p, V ) >
√
3/2. We now show that we can compute such a point in O(n logn) time, namely,
we show how to compute a triple as in Lemma 2.5 in O(n logn) time. We follow the definitions
and notation from the proof of that lemma. We will assume that n is odd, which, as argued,
is without loss of generality.
To find a concurrent triple of balanced lines, we first compute the lines `1(0), `2(0), `3(0)
in O(n) time. If they are concurrent, we are done. Otherwise, there is a θ¯ ∈ (0, pi/3) such
that `1(θ¯), `2(θ¯), `3(θ¯) are concurrent. To find this value θ¯ we dualize the voter set V , using
the standard duality transform that maps a point (a, b) to the non-vertical line y = ax+ b
and vice versa. Let v∗ denote the dual line of the voter v, and let V ∗ := {v∗ : v ∈ V }. Note
that for θ ∈ (0, pi/3) the lines `1(θ), `2(θ), `3(θ) are all non-vertical, therefore their duals `∗i (θ)
are well-defined.
Consider the arrangement A(V ∗) defined by the duals of the voters. For θ 6= 0, define
slope(θ) to be the slope of the lines with orientation θ. Then µ∗(θ), the dual of µ(θ), is the
intersection point of the vertical line x = slope(θ) with Lmed, the median level in A(V ∗).
(The median level of A(V ∗) is the set of points q such that there are fewer than n/2 lines
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below q and fewer than n/2 lines above q; this is well defined since we assume n is odd.
The median level forms an x-monotone polygonal curve along edges of A(V ∗).) Observe
that the duals `∗1(θ), `∗2(θ), `∗3(θ) all lie on Lmed. For θ ∈ (0, pi/3), the x-coordinate of `∗1(θ)
lies in (−∞,−1/√3), the x-coordinate of `∗2(θ) lies in (−1/
√
3, 1/
√
3), and the x-coordinate
of `∗3(θ) lies in (1/
√
3,∞). We split Lmed into three pieces corresponding to these ranges
of the x-coordinate. Let E1, E2, and E3 denote the sets of edges forming the parts of Lmed
in the first, second, and third range, respectively, where edges crossing the vertical lines
x = −1/√3 and x = 1/√3 are split; see Fig. 6. Thus, for any θ ∈ (0, pi/3) and for i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
the point `∗i (θ) lies on an edge in Ei.
Recall that we want to find a value θ¯ ∈ (0, pi/3) such that `1(θ¯), `2(θ¯), `3(θ¯) are concurrent.
For −∞ < x < 1/√3, let θx be such that slope(θx) = x, and for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} define
pi(x) := `∗i (θx). We are thus looking for a value x¯ ∈ (−∞, 1/
√
3) such that the three points
p1(x¯), p2(x¯), p3(x¯) are collinear.
One way to find x¯ would be to first explicitly compute Lmed; then we can increase x,
starting at x = −∞, and see how the points pi(x) move over Ei, until we reach a value x¯
such that p1(x¯), p2(x¯), p3(x¯) are collinear. Since the best known bounds on the complexity
of the median level is O(n4/3) [9] we will proceed differently, as follows.
1. Use the recursive algorithm described below to find an interval I¯ ⊆ (−∞, 1/√3) containing
a value x¯ with the desired property—namely, that the points p1(x¯), p2(x¯), and p3(x¯) are
collinear—and such that, for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the point pi(x) lies on the same edge of Ei
for all x ∈ I¯.
2. Find a value x¯ ∈ I¯ such that p1(x¯), p2(x¯), and p3(x¯) are collinear. Since for i = 1, 2, 3
each pi(x) lies on a fixed edge ei of Lmed for all x ∈ I¯ after Step 1, this can be done in
O(1) time. Indeed, if we go back to primal space we are given three (not necessarily
distinct) voters v1, v2, v3 (namely, the primals of the lines containing e1, e2, and e3) and
a range (θ, θ′) of angles (corresponding to the x-range I¯), such that the line `i(θ) passes
through vi for any θ ∈ (θ, θ′). We then only have to compute an orientation θ¯ ∈ (θ, θ′)
such that the lines `i(θ) meet in a common point—such an orientation θ¯ is guaranteed to
exist by our construction of I¯.
We now explain the recursive algorithm used in Step 1. In a generic call we are given three
trapezoids ∆1,∆2,∆3 that are each bounded by two non-vertical edges and two vertical edges
(one of which may degenerate into a point). Let Ii be the x-range of ∆i, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3};
note that this is well-defined since ∆i is a trapezoid delimited by two vertical edges. The
trapezoids ∆1,∆2,∆3 will have the following properties.
(P1) Trapezoid ∆1 lies inside the vertical slab (−∞,−1/
√
3) × (−∞,∞), trapezoid ∆2 lies
inside the vertical slab (−1/√3, 1/√3) × (−∞,∞), and trapezoid ∆3 lies inside the
vertical slab (1/
√
3,∞)× (−∞,∞). Moreover, the x-ranges I1, I2, I3 correspond to each
other in the following sense. Recall that an x-range I ⊂ (−∞,−1/√3) in the dual plane
x = −1/√3 x = 1/
√
3
Lmed
E1 E2 E3
Figure 6 The edge sets E1, E2, and E3 of Lmed, the median level in A(V ∗).
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corresponds to an angular interval (φ, φ′) in the primal plane. We denote by I ⊕ θ the
x-range corresponding to the angular interval (φ+ θ, φ′ + θ). The x-ranges I1, I2, I3 will
be such that I2 = I1 ⊕ pi3 and I3 = I1 ⊕ 2pi3 .
(P2) For any i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the part of the median level Lmed inside the vertical slab Ii×(−∞,∞)
lies entirely inside ∆i. Together with the property (P1) this implies that for any x ∈ I1
we have that pi(x) ∈ ∆i, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
(P3) Let xleft and xright be such that I1 = (xleft, xright). Then we have: If p1(xleft) lies above
the line through p2(xleft) and p3(xleft), then p1(xright) lies below the line through p2(xright)
and p3(xright), and vice versa. This guarantees that there exists a value x¯ ∈ I1 with the
desired property and, hence, that I1 contains the interval I¯ we are looking for.
In a recursive call we are also given for each ∆i the sets V ∗i ⊆ V ∗ of lines intersecting the
interior of ∆i, as well as n−i , the number of lines from V ∗ passing completely below ∆i.
Initially, ∆1 is the unbounded trapezoid4 (−∞,−1/
√
3)×(−∞,∞). Similarly, we initially
have ∆2 = (−1/
√
3, 1/
√
3) × (−∞,∞) and ∆3 = (1/
√
3,∞) × (−∞,∞). Furthermore,
V ∗i = V ∗ and n−i = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
The recursion ends when the interior of each ∆i is intersected by a single edge of Lmed;
we then have I¯ := I1. The recursive call for a given triple ∆1,∆2,∆3 starts by shrinking
∆1 to a trapezoid ∆′1—thus zooming in on the value x¯—as follows. (We assume |V ∗1 | > 1,
otherwise the shrinking of ∆1 can be skipped.).
(i) Set r := 2 and construct a (1/r)-cutting for the lines in V ∗1 , clipped to within ∆1. In
other words, construct a partition Ξ of ∆1 into O(r2) = O(1) smaller trapezoids—see
Fig. 7—such that the interior of each trapezoid τ ∈ Ξ is intersected by at most n1/2 lines
from V ∗1 , where n1 := |V ∗1 |. Computing Ξ can be done in O(n1) time [6].
(ii) Compute the intersections of Lmed with the edges of each trapezoid τ ∈ Ξ in O(n1 logn1)
time, as follows.
Consider a non-vertical edge e of τ . First, compute the level of pleft, the left endpoint
of e. This can be done by counting the number of lines from V ∗1 below pleft and adding
4 Since xleft = −∞ for this initial trapezoid ∆1, the points pi(xleft) are not well defined. Recall, however,
that in the primal plane the point on Lmed “at x = −∞” corresponds to the vertical balanced line `1(0).
Hence, we can derive the relative position of p1(−∞) with respect to the line through p2(−∞) and
p3(−∞), from the relative position of the intersection point `2(0) ∩ `3(0) with respect to `1(0).
xleft = ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ7 ξ8 ξ9 ξ10 = xright
Lmed
Figure 7 The trapezoid ∆1 (depicted in black) and the cutting Ξ (depicted in grey).
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n−1 to this number. Next, intersect e with all lines of V ∗1 and sort the intersections
along e, distinguishing lines that cross e “from above” and “from below.” Finally,
walk along e, starting from pleft towards the right, increasing and decreasing the level
according to the type of the intersection we encounter. All intersection points that lie
on Lmed can thus be reported. (For simplicity we ignore the case where e partially
or fully overlaps Lmed. This can either be handled by a simple modification of the
procedure, or we can avoid the situation altogether by modifying the cutting such that
no edge e of the cutting is contained in an input line.)
For a vertical edge e of τ , we proceed similarly: first compute the level of the lower
endpoint of e, and then walk upward along e until we reach an intersection point at
the median level, or the upper endpoint of e.
(iii) The previous step gives us all intersection points of Lmed with the edges of trapezoids
in Ξ. Let X = {ξ1, . . . ξ|X|} be the sorted set of all x-coordinates of these intersection
points, as illustrated in Fig. 7. Note that |X| = O(n1). We perform a binary search
on X to find two consecutive x-coordinates, ξi and ξi+1, such that the interval (ξi, ξi+1)
contains a value x¯ with the desired property. Each step in the binary search can be done
in O(n1 + n2 + n3) time, as follows.
Assume without loss of generality that p1(xleft) lies above the line through p2(xleft) and
p3(xleft), and that p1(xright) lies below the line through p2(xright) and p3(xright). Suppose
that during the binary search we arrive at some ξj ∈ X, and we want to decide if we
want to proceed to the left or to the right of ξj . To do so, we first compute the points
p1(ξj), p2(ξj), and p3(ξj). Point p1(ξj) can be computed in O(n1) time, as follows: first
compute all intersections of the vertical line x = ξj with the lines in V ∗1 , and then find
the intersection point whose y-coordinate has the appropriate rank, taking into account
that there are n−1 lines from V ∗ \ V ∗1 fully below ∆1. The points p2(ξj) and p3(ξj) can
be computed in the same way—this takes O(n2) and O(n3) time, respectively—after
determining their x-coordinates in O(1) time. (These x-coordinate are slope(θξj + pi/3)
and slope(θξj + 2pi/3), respectively.) After computing p1(ξj), p2(ξj), and p3(ξj) we can
make our decision: we proceed to the left if p1(ξj) lies below the line through p2(ξj) and
p3(ξj), and to the right if p1(ξj) lies above that line. (In the fortunate situation that
p1(ξj), p2(ξj), p3(ξj) are collinear, we can take x¯ := ξj and we are done.)
Since each step in the binary search takes O(n1 + n2 + n3) time, the total binary search
takes O((n1 + n2 + n+ 3) logn1) time. Sorting the set X before the binary search only
increases this by a constant factor.
(iv) Finally, we take the two x-coordinates ξi, ξi+1 computed in the previous step, and find
the points where Lmed crosses the vertical lines x = ξi and x = ξi+1. Between x = ξi and
x = ξi+1 we know that Lmed lies inside a single trapezoid τ ∈ Ξ. We then intersect τ with
the slab (ξi, ξi+1) × (−∞,∞), to obtain the trapezoid ∆′1. (If, for example, we would
have (ξi, ξi+1) = (ξ3, ξ4) in Fig. 7, then ∆′1 is the grey trapezoid.) Note that the number
of lines crossing ∆′1 is at most n1/2 and that the x-range I ′1 of ∆′1 satisfies property (P3).
After shrinking ∆1 in this manner, we proceed as follows. We first clip ∆2 such that
its x-range corresponds to I1 ⊕ pi3 , and then we shrink the clipped trapezoid ∆2 to a new
trapezoid ∆′2 in the same way as we shrunk ∆1 to ∆′1. Thus ∆′2 is crossed by at most n2/2
lines and I ′2 ⊕ −pi3 satisfies property (P3), where I ′2 is the x-range of ∆′2. Next, we clip the
x-range of ∆3 to I ′2 ⊕ pi3 , and then we apply the shrinking procedure to ∆3 to obtain a new
trapezoid ∆′3. Finally, we clip ∆′1 and ∆′2 so that their x-ranges correspond to I ′3 ⊕ −2pi3 and
I ′3⊕ −pi3 , respectively. We then recurse on the triple ∆′1,∆′2,∆′3, passing along the appropriate
sets V ∗i and updating the counts n−i .
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The total time spent in all three shrinking steps is O((n1 + n2 + n3) log(n1 + n2 + n3)),
and each ni halves at every level in the recursion. Hence, the total time for Step 1 on page 9
is O(n logn). As already mentioned, Step 2 takes only constant time. We can conclude
that we can find a collinear triple p1(x¯), p2(x¯), p3(x¯) in O(n logn) time. In the primal this
corresponds to a triple of collinear concurrent lines as in Lemma 2.4, so we obtain following
theorem.
I Theorem 2.6.
(i) We have β∗2 =
√
3/2. Moreover, for any multiset V of n voters in R2 we can compute a
point p with β(p, V ) >
√
3/2 in O(n logn) time.
(ii) For d > 3, we have 1/
√
d 6 β∗d 6
√
3/2. Moreover, for any multiset V of n voters in Rd
with d > 2, we can compute a point p with β(p, V ) > 1/
√
d in O(n) time.
3 Finding a point that maximizes β(p, V )
We know from Theorem 2.6 that, for any multiset V of n voters in Rd, we can compute a
point p with β(p, V ) ≥ 1/√d (even with β(p, V ) ≥ √3/2, in the plane). However, a given
voter multiset V may admit a β-plurality point for larger values of β—possibly even for
β = 1. In this section we study the problem of computing a point p that maximizes β(p, V ),
that is, a point p with β(p, V ) = β(V ).
3.1 An exact algorithm
Below we sketch an exact algorithm to compute β(V ) together with a point p such that
β(p, V ) = β(V ). Our goal is to show that, for constant d, this can be done in polynomial
time. We do not make a special effort to optimize the exponent in the running time; it may
be possible to speed up the algorithm, but it seems clear that it will remain impractical,
because of the asymptotic running time, and also because of algebraic issues.
Note that we can efficiently check whether a true plurality point exists (i.e., β = 1 can be
achieved) in time O(n logn) by an algorithm of De Berg et al. [4], and if so, identify this
point. Therefore, hereafter β = 1 is used as a sentinel value, and our algorithm proceeds on
the assumption that β(p, V ) < 1 for any point p.
For a voter v ∈ V , a candidate p ∈ Rd, and an alternative candidate q ∈ Rd, define
fv(p, q) := min(|qv|/|pv|, 1) when p 6= v, and define fv(p, q) := 1 otherwise. Observe that for
fv(p, q) < 1 we have
q wins voter v over p if and only if β > fv(p, q),
q and p have a tie over voter v if and only if β = fv(p, q), and
p wins voter v over q if and only if β < fv(p, q).
For fv(p, q) = 1 this is not quite true: when p = q = v we always have a tie, and when
|pv| < |qv| then p wins v even when β = fv(p, q) = 1. When p = q there is a tie for all voters,
so the final conclusion (namely that
∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ > ∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣) is still correct. The fact that
we incorrectly conclude that there is a tie when |pv| < |qv| and β = fv(p, q) = 1 does not
present a problem either, since we assume β(p, V ) < 1. Hence, we can pretend that checking
if β > fv(p, q), or β = fv(p, q), or β < fv(p, q) tells us whether q wins v, or there’s a tie, or p
wins v, respectively.
Hereafter we identify fv : R2d → R with its graph {(p, q, fv(p, q))} ⊂ R2d+1, which is a
d-dimensional surface. Let f+v be the set of points lying above this graph, and f−v be the set of
points lying below it. Thus f+v is precisely the set of combinations of (p, q, β) where q wins v
over p, while fv is the set where p ties with q, and f−v is the set where q loses v to p. Consider
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the arrangement A := A(F ) defined by the set of surfaces F := {fv : v ∈ V }. Each face C
in A is a maximal connected set of points with the property that all points of C are contained
in, lie below, or lie above, the same subset of surfaces of F . (Note that we consider faces of
all dimensions, not just full-dimensional cells.) Thus for all (p, q, β) ∈ C, exactly one of the
following holds:
∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ < ∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣, or ∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ = ∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣, or ∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ >∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣. Let L be the union of all faces C of A(F ) such that ∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ < ∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣,
that is, such that p loses against q for all (p, q, β) in C. We can construct A and L in
time O(n2d+1) using standard machinery, as A is an arrangement of degree-4 semi-algebraic
surfaces of constant description complexity [2, 3]. We are interested in the set
W := {(p, β) : ∣∣V [p β q]∣∣ > ∣∣V [p ≺β q]∣∣ for any competitor q } ⊂ Rd+1.
What is the relationship between W and L? A point (p, β) is in W precisely when, for every
choice of q ∈ Rd, p wins at least as many voters as q (for the given β). In other words,
W = {(p, β) | there is no q such that (p, q, β) ∈ L}.
That is, W is the complement of the projection of L to the space Rd+1 representing the
pairs (p, β). The most straightforward way to implement the projection would involve
constructing semi-algebraic formulas describing individual faces and invoking quantifier
elimination on the resulting formulas [2]. Below we outline a more obviously polynomial-time
alternative.
Construct the vertical decomposition vd(A) of A, which is a refinement of A into pieces
(“subfaces” τ), each bounded by at most 2(2d+ 1) surfaces of constant degree and therefore
of constant complexity; see Appendix A. A vertical decomposition is specified by ordering
the coordinates—we put the coordinates corresponding to q last. Since vd(A) is a refinement
of A, the set L is the union of subfaces τ of vd(A) fully contained in L. Since A is
an arrangement of n well-behaved surfaces in 2d + 1 > 5 dimensions, the complexity of
vd(A) is O(n2(2d+1)−4+ε) = O(n4d−2+ε), for any ε > 0 [21]. In particular, L comprises
` := O(n4d−2+ε) subfaces.
Since each τ ⊂ L is a subface of the vertical decomposition vd(A) in which the last
d coordinates correspond to q, the projection τ ′ of τ to Rd+1 is easy obtain (see Appendix A)
in constant time; indeed it can be obtained by discarding the constraints on these last
d coordinates from the description of τ . Thus, in time O(`) we can construct the family of all
the projections of the ` subfaces of L, each a constant-complexity semi-algebraic object in Rd+1.
We now construct the arrangement A′ of the resulting collection and its vertical decomposition
vd(A′). The complexity of vd(A′) is either O(`d+1+ε) or O(`2(d+1)−4+ε) = O(`2d−2+ε),
depending on whether d+ 1 6 4 or not, respectively [21]. Each subface in vd(A′) is either
fully contained in the projection of L or fully disjoint from it. Collecting all of the latter
subfaces, we obtain a representation of W as a union of at most O(`O(d)) = O(nO(d2))
constant-complexity semi-algebraic objects.
Now if (p, β) ∈W is the point with the highest value of β, then β(V ) = β(p, V ) = β. It
can be found by enumerating all the subfaces of vd(A′) contained in the closure of W—we
take the closure because V (p, β) is defined as a supremum—and identifying their topmost
point or points. Since each face has constant complexity, this can be done in O(1) time per
subface.5 This completes our description of an O(nO(d2))-time algorithm to compute the
5 Once again, the projection to the β coordinate is particularly easy to obtain if, when constructing
vd(A′), we set the coordinate corresponding to β first.
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best β that can be achieved for a given set of voters V , and the candidate p (or the set of
candidates) that achieve this value.
3.2 An approximation algorithm
Since computing β(V ) exactly appears expensive, we now turn our attention to approximation
algorithms. In particular, given a voter set V in Rd and an ε ∈ (0, 1/2], we wish to compute
a point p such that β(p, V ) > (1− ε) · β(V ).
Our approximation algorithm works in two steps. In the first step, we compute a set P
of O(n/ε2d−1 log(1/ε)) candidates. P may not contain the true optimal point p, but we will
ensure that P contains a point p such that β(p, V ) > (1− ε/2) · β(V ). In the second step,
we approximate β(p′, V ) for each p′ ∈ P , to find an approximately best candidate.
Constructing the candidate set P . To construct the candidate set P , we will generate,
for each voter vi ∈ V , a set Pi of O(1/ε2d−1 log(1/ε)) candidate points. Our final set P of
candidates will be the union of the sets P1, . . . , Pn. Next we describe how to construct Pi.
Partition Rd into a set C of O(1/εd−1) simplicial cones with apex at vi and opening angle
ε/(2
√
d), so that for every pair of points u and u′ in the same cone we have ∠uviu′ 6 ε/(2
√
d).
We assume for simplicity (and can easily guarantee) that no voter in V lies on the boundary
of any of the cones, except for vi itself and any voters coinciding with vi. Let C(vi) denote
the set of all cones in C whose interior contains at least one voter. For each cone C ∈ C(vi) we
generate a candidate set Gi(C) as explained next, and then we set Pi :=
⋃
C∈C(vi)Gi(C)∪{vi}.
Let dC be the distance from vi to the nearest other voter (not coinciding with vi) in C.
Let Ai(C) be the closed spherical shell defined by the two spheres of radii ε · dC and dC/ε
around vi, as shown in Fig. 8(i). The open ball of radius ε · dC is denoted by Aini (C), and
the complement of the closed ball of radius dC/ε is denoted by Aouti (C). Let Gi(C) be the
vertices in an exponential grid defined by a collection of spheres centered at vi, and the
extreme rays of the cones in C; see Fig. 8(ii). The spheres have radii (1 + ε/4)i · ε · dC ,
for 0 6 i 6 log(1+ε/4)(1/ε2) = O((1/ε) log(1/ε)). Observe that Gi(C) contains not only
points in C, but in the entire spherical shell Ai(C). The set Gi(C) consists of O(1/εd log(1/ε))
points, and it has the following property:
Let p be any point in the spherical shell Ai(C), and let p′ be a corner of the grid cell
containing p and nearest to p. Then |p′p| 6 ε · |pvi|. (∗)
To prove the property, let q be the point on pvi such that |qvi| = |p′vi|. From the construction
of the exponential grid we have |pq| 6 ε4 ·|pvi|. Since p′ and q lie in the same cone ∠p′viq 6 ε2√d
and, consequently, |p′q| 6 ε2 · |qvi| 6 (1 + ε4 ) · ε2 · |pvi|. The property is now immediate since
|pp′| 6 |pq|+ |qp′| < ε · |pvi|.
As mentioned above, Pi :=
⋃
C∈C(vi)Gi(C) ∪ {vi}, and the final candidate set P is
defined as P :=
⋃
vi∈V Pi. Computing the sets Pi is easy: for each of the O(1/ε
d−1) cones
C ∈ C(vi), determine the nearest neighbor of vi in C in O(n) time by brute force, and
then generate Gi(C) in O((1/ε(d−1)) log(1/ε)) time. (It is not hard to speed up the nearest-
neighbor computation using appropriate data structures, but this will not improve the final
running time in Theorem 3.4.) We obtain the following lemma.
I Lemma 3.1. The candidate set P has size O(n/ε2d−1 log(1/ε)) and can be constructed in
O(n2/εd−1 + n/ε2d−1 log(1/ε)) time.
The next lemma is crucial to show that P is a good candidate set.
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vi
radius = dc/ε
Ai(C) Aouti (C)
vi
radius = εdCAini (C)
(i) (ii)
Figure 8 (i) The closed spherical shell Ai(C) defined by the two balls of radii ε · dC
and dC/ε around vi. (ii) The exponential grid Gi(C). The grid is defined by a collection
of spheres centered at vi, plus extreme rays of the cones with apex at vi. The spheres have
radii (1 + ε/4)i · ε · dC for 0 6 i 6 log(1+ε/4)(1/ε2) = O((1/ε) log(1/ε)), and the interior
angle of a cone is ε/2
√
d.
I Lemma 3.2. For any point p ∈ Rd, there exists a point p′ ∈ P with the following property:
for any voter vj ∈ V , we have that |p′vj | 6 (1 + 2ε) · |pvj |.
Proof. Let vi be a voter nearest to p. We will argue that the set Pi contains a point p′ with
the desired property. We distinguish three cases.
Case I: There is a cone C ∈ C(vi) such that p lies in the spherical shell Ai(C). In this case
we pick p′ to be a point of Gi(C) nearest to p, that is, p′ is a corner nearest to p of the grid
cell containing p. By property (∗) we have
|p′vj | 6 |p′p|+ |pvj | 6 ε · |pvi|+ |pvj | 6 (1 + ε) · |pvj |,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that vi is a voter nearest to p.
Case II: Point p lies in Aini (C) for all C ∈ C(vi). In this case we pick p′ := vi. Clearly
|p′vj | = 0 6 (1 + ε) · |pvj | for j = i. For j 6= i, we argue as follows. Let C ∈ C(vi) be the
cone containing vj . Since we are in Case II we know that p ∈ Aini (C), and so
|p′vj | 6 |p′p|+ |pvj | 6 εdC + |pvj | 6 ε|p′vj |+ |pvj |. (1)
Moreover, we have
|pvj | > |p′vj | − |pp′| > |p′vj | − εdC > |p′vj |/2, (2)
where the last step uses that ε 6 1/2 and dC 6 |p′vj |. Combining (1) and (2), we obtain
|p′vj | 6 (1 + 2ε) · |pvj |.
Case III: Cases I and II do not apply. In this case there is at least one cone C such that
p ∈ Aouti (C). Of all such cones, let C∗ be the one whose associated distance dC∗ is maximized.
Let p′′ be the point on the segment pvi at distance dC/ε from vi. Without loss of generality,
we will assume that p and vi only differ in the xd coordinate; see Fig. 9(i).
We will prove that the point p′ of Gi(C∗) nearest to p′′ (refer to Fig. 9(i)) has the desired
property. Consider a voter vj . We distinguish three cases.
When i = j, then we have
|p′vi| 6 |p′p′′|+ |p′′vi| 6 (1 + ε)|p′′vi| 6 (1 + ε)|pvi|,
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Figure 9 Illustration for Case III.
where the second inequality follows from (∗).
When vj lies in a cone C such that p ∈ Aini (C), then we can use the same argument as in
Case II to show that |p′vj | 6 (1 + 2ε) · |pvj |.
In the remaining case vj lies in a cone C such that p ∈ Aouti (C). Let vk be a voter in
C nearest to vi. Since |vivk| = dC , |pvi| > dC/ε, and |pvk| > |pvi|, we can deduce that
∠pvivk > pi/2 − ε/2, as illustrated in Fig. 9(ii). Furthermore, since vk and vj belong
to the same cone C the angle ∠vkvivj is bounded by ε/2
√
d 6 ε/2 according to the
construction. Putting the two angle bounds together we conclude that ∠pvivj > pi2 − ε.
Now consider the triangle defined by p, vi and vj . From the Law of Sines we obtain
|vivj |
sin∠vipvj
= |pvj |sin∠pvivj , or |vivj | = |pvj | ·
sin∠vipvj
sin∠pvivj
6 |pvj |cos ε 6 (1 + ε) · |pvj |,
for ε < 1/2. Since p′′ lies on the line between p and vi we have:
|p′′vj | 6 max{|pvj |, |vivj |} 6 (1 + ε) · |pvj |.
Finally we get the claimed bound by noting that |p′p′′| 6 ε · |p′vi| (from (*)),
|p′vj | 6 |p′p′′|+ |p′′vj | 6 ε · |p′vi|+ (1 + ε) · |pvj | 6 (1 + 2ε) · |pvj |. J
An approximate decision algorithm. Given a point p, a positive real value ε and the voter
multiset V , we say that an algorithm Alg is an ε-approximate decision algorithm if
Alg answers yes if p is a β-plurality point, and
Alg answers no if p is not a (1− ε)β-plurality point.
In the remaining cases, where (1− ε)β < β(p, V ) < β, Alg may answer yes or no.
Next we propose an ε-approximate decision algorithm Alg. The algorithm will use the
so-called Balanced Box-Decomposition (BBD) tree introduced by Arya and Mount [1]. BBD
trees are hierarchical space-decomposition trees such that each node µ represents a region
in Rd, denoted by region(µ), which is a d-dimensional axis-aligned box or the difference of
two such boxes. A BBD tree for a set P of n points in Rd can be built in O(n logn) time
using O(n) space. It supports (1 + ε)-approximate range counting queries with convex query
ranges in O(logn+ ε1−d) time [1]. In our algorithm all query ranges will be balls, hence a
(1 + ε)-approximate range-counting query for a d-dimensional ball s(v, r) with center at v
and radius r returns an integer I such that |P ∩ s(v, r)| 6 I 6 |P ∩ s(v, (1 + ε)r)|.
Our ε-approximate decision algorithm Alg works as follows.
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1. Construct a set Q of O(n/εd−1) potential candidates competing against p, as follows.
Let Q(v) be a set of O(1/εd−1) points distributed uniformly on the boundary of the ball
s(v, (1− ε/2) · β · |pv|), such that the distance between any point on the boundary and
its nearest neighbor in Q(v) is at most ε4√d · |pv| 6
ε
4 · β · |pv|. In the last step we use the
fact that β > 1/
√
d, according to Lemma 2.3. Set Q := Q(v1) ∪ · · · ∪Q(vn).
2. Build a BBD tree T on Q. Add a counter c(µ) to each node µ in T , initialized to zero.
3. For each voter v ∈ V perform a (1 + ε/4)-approximate range-counting query with
s(v, (1− ε/4) · β · |pv|) in T . We modify the search in T slightly as follows. If an internal
node µ ∈ T is visited and expanded during the search, then for every non-expanded child
µ′ of µ with region(µ′) entirely contained in s(v, (1+ε/4)(1−ε/4) ·β · |pv|)) ⊂ s(v, β · |pv|)
we increment the counter c(µ′). Similarly, if a leaf is visited then the counter is incremented
if the point stored in the leaf lies within s(v, (1− ε/4) · β · |pv|).
4. For a leaf µ in T , let M(µ) be the set of nodes in T on the path from the root to µ, and
let C(µ) =
∑
µ′∈M(µ) c(µ′). Compute C(µ) for all leaves µ in T by a pre-order traversal
of T , and set C := maxµ C(µ).
5. If C 6 n/2, then return yes, otherwise no.
To prove correctness of the algorithm we define, for a given γ > 0, a fuzzy ball sγ(v, r) to
be any set such that s(v, r) ⊆ sγ(v, r) ⊆ s(v, (1+γ)r). Thus if q ∈ s(v, r) then q ∈ sγ(v, r), if
q 6∈ s(v, (1 + γ)r) then q 6∈ sγ(v, r), and otherwise q may or may not be inside in sγ(v, r). We
now observe that for each voter vi ∈ V there is a fuzzy ball sε/4(v1, (1−ε/4)·β ·|pvi|) such that
the value C(µ) for a leaf µ storing a point q is the depth of q in the arrangement, denoted by
Aε/4(V, 1− ε/4), of the fuzzy balls sε/4(v1, (1− ε/4) ·β · |pv1|), . . . , sε/4(vn, (1− ε/4) ·β · |pv|).
I Lemma 3.3. Algorithm Alg ε-approximately decides if p is a β-plurality point in time
O( n
εd−1 log
n
εd−1 ).
Proof. We start by analyzing the running time of the algorithm. Constructing the set
of points in Q can be done in time linear in |Q|, while building the BBD-tree T requires
O((n/εd−1) log(n/εd−1)) time [1, Lemma 1]. Next, the algorithm performs n approximate
range queries, each requiring O(log n
εd−1 +
1
εd−1 ) time [1, Theorem 2]). Note that the small
modification we made to the query algorithm to update the counters does not increase the
asymptotic running time. Finally, the traversal of T to compute C takes time linear in the
size of T , which is O(n/εd−1).
It remains to prove that Alg is correct.
If p is a plurality point there can be no point q ∈ Rd having depth greater than n/2 in the
arrangement of the balls s(v1, β · |pv|), . . . , s(vn, β · |pv|). Since sε/4(v, (1−ε/4) ·β · |pv|) ⊂
s(v, β · |pv|), for all v, Alg could not have found a point with depth greater than n/2,
and hence, must return yes.
If p is not a (1−ε)β-plurality point, then there exists a point q with depth greater than n/2
in the arrangement A(V, 1− ε) of the balls s(v1, (1− ε) ·β · |pv|), . . . , s(vn, (1− ε) ·β · |pv|).
Let q′ be the point in Q nearest to q. We claim that for any ball s(v, (1 − ε) · β · |pv|)
that contains q, its expanded version s(v, (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|) contains q′. Of course, if
s(v, (1− ε) · β · |pv|) contains q′ then we are done. Otherwise, let x be the point where
qq′ intersects the boundary of s(v, (1− ε) · β · |pv|); see Fig. 10. Note that q′ must also
be the point in Q nearest to x.
Let x′ be the point on the boundary of s(v, (1− ε/2) · β · |pv|) nearest to x, and let q′′ be
a point in Q on the boundary of s(v, (1− ε/2) · β · |pv|). By construction, we have
|xx′| = ε4 · β · |pv| and |x
′q′′| 6 ε4 · β · |pv|
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Figure 10 Illustrating the three balls of different radius used in the correctness proof
of Lemma 3.3.
and, by the triangle inequality, we obtain
|xq′| 6 |xq′′| 6 |xx′|+ |x′q′′| 6 ε2 · β · |pv|.
This implies that s(v, (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|) ⊆ sε/4(v, (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|) must contain q′.
Consequently, if q has depth at least n/2 in A(V, 1− ε) then q′ has depth at least n/2 in
the arrangement Aε/4(V, (1− ε/4)), and hence, the algorithm will return no. J
The algorithm. Now we have the tools required to approximate β(V ). First, generate the
set P of O( n
ε2d−1 log
1
ε ) candidate points. For each candidate point p ∈ P , perform a binary
search for an approximate β∗(p) in the interval [1/
√
d, 1], until the remaining search interval
has length at most ε/2 · 1/√d. For each p and β∗, (ε/2)-approximately decide if p is a
β∗-plurality point in V . Return the largest β∗ and the corresponding point p on which the
algorithm says yes.
I Theorem 3.4. Given a multiset V of voters in Rd, a ((1− ε) · β(V ))-plurality point can
be computed in O( n2
ε3d−2 · log nεd−1 · log2 1ε ).
4 Concluding Remarks
We proved that any finite set of voters in Rd admits a β-plurality point for β = 1/
√
d and
that some sets require β =
√
3/2. For d = 2 we managed to close the gap by showing that
β∗2 =
√
3/2. One of the main open problems is to close the gap for d > 2. Recall that recently
the bounds for d > 4 have been improved—see Footnote 3 in the introduction—but there is
still a small gap left between the upper and lower bound.
We also presented an approximation algorithm that finds, for a given V , a (1− ε) · β(V )-
plurality point. The algorithm runs in O∗(n2/ε3d−2) time. Another open problem is whether
a subquadratic approximation algorithm exists, and to prove lower bounds on the time to
compute β(V ) or β(p, V ) exactly. Finally, it will be interesting to study β-plurality points in
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other metrics, for instance in the personalized L1-metric [4] for d > 2 or in the L1-metric for
d > 2.
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Appendix
A A primer on vertical decompositions
We follow the notation and terminology of [7, 26]. A vertical decomposition is, roughly, any
partition of space into finitely many so-called cylindrical cells (see below for a definition);
it need not be a topological complex. A vertical decomposition of an arrangement is a
refinement of an arrangement into cylindrical cells,6 where refinement means that each
cylindrical cell is a subset of a face in the arrangement. We define cylindrical cells recursively.
To simplify the notation, any inequality limit in our definitions can be omitted, i.e., replaced
by a ±∞, as appropriate. For example, when we talk about an open interval (a, b), i.e., the
set of numbers x with a < x < b, we include the possibilities of the unbounded intervals
(−∞, b), (a,+∞), and (−∞,+∞).
A one-dimensional cylindrical cell is either a singleton or an open interval (a, b). So
a one-dimensional vertical decomposition is a decomposition of R into a finite number of
singletons and intervals.
We now define a cylindrical cell τ in R2. Its projection τ ′ to the x1-axis is a cylindrical
cell in R. The cell τ must have one of the following two forms:
{(x1, f2(x1)) | x1 ∈ τ ′}, where f2 : τ ′ → R is a continuous total function, or
{(x1, x2) | x1 ∈ τ ′, f2(x1) < x2 < g2(x1)}, where f2, g2 : τ ′ → R are two continuous total
functions, with the property that f2(x1) < g2(x1) for all x1 ∈ τ ′.
6 The specific decomposition depends on the algorithm used to construct it and on the ordering of the
coordinates. In the computational- and combinatorial-geometry literature, one often speaks of “the
vertical decomposition of the arrangement” in the sense of “the vertical decomposition obtained by
applying the algorithm, say, of Chazelle et al. [7] or of Koltun [21], to the given arrangement.”
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If τ ′ is a singleton, the former defines a vertex and the latter an (open) vertical segment. If
τ ′ is an interval, the former defines an open monotone arc (a portion of the graph of the
function f2) and the latter an open pseudo-trapezoid delimited by two (possibly degenerate)
vertical segments on left and right and by the two disjoint function graphs below and above.
(Recall that any of the limits may be omitted. For example, R2 is a legal cell in a trivial
two-dimensional vertical decomposition consisting only of itself, where all the limits have
been “replaced by infinities.”)
A cylindrical cell τ ⊂ Rd is defined recursively. Its projection τ ′ is a cylindrical cell
in Rd−1. Moreover, τ must have one of the following forms:
{(x′, fd(x1, . . . , xd−1)) | x′ ∈ τ ′}, where fd : τ ′ → R is a continuous total function, or
{(x′, xd) | x′ ∈ τ ′, fd(x′) < xd < gd(x′)}, where fd, gd : τ ′ → R are two continuous total
functions, with the property that fd(x′) < gd(x′) for all x′ ∈ τ ′.
A cylindrical cell is fully specified by giving its dimension and the sequence of functions fi
or pairs of functions fi, gi, as appropriate. In particular, the projection of the cell in a
k-dimensional decomposition to its first k′ < k coordinates can be obtained by retaining the
inequalities in the first k′ coordinates and discarding the remaining ones.
